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NOTE
Bowers v. Hardwick: No Constitutional Protection for Private Consensual
Homosexual Intimacy
I. INTRODUCTION
All fifty states prohibited homosexual behavior in the 1950s.1 Success-
ful challenges to sodomy2 statutes began in the 1960s when Illinois
adopted the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code which
decriminalized adult consensual private sexual conduct.3 Today, half the
states continue to criminalize private consensual sodomy.4 Justification
for the statutes ranges from majoritarian morality principles and public
welfare concerns to religious and biblical teachings.'
Resorting to the judiciary had been somewhat successful for homosex-
uals in matters such as professional licensing, public employment, and
immigration.6 Gay rights activists were encouraged by the number of
states whose legislatures chose to repeal their sodomy statutes. Legal
and social commentators were optimistic that the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of intimate association would be extended to homosexual
associations as well as to heterosexual ones.7 Although the issue of con-
sensual homosexual conduct had arisen in unsuccessful challenges to the
constitutionality of sodomy laws and in military discharge proceedings,8
the Supreme Court had never resolved the issue or articulated a principle
1. Rivera, Book Review, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 391,410 (1984) (revieving J. D'EMILIO, SEXUAL
POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1940-1970 (1983)).
2. Sodomy generally refers to copulation with a member of the same sex or with an animal, or
anal or oral copulation with a member of the opposite sex. State statutes vary as to practices and
parties to which they apply. Annotation, Validity of Statute Making Sodomy a Criminal Offense, 20
A.L.R.4th 1009 (1982).
3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 n.7 (1986).
4. Id. at 2845. States which criminalize sodomy are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia and the District of Columbia. Id. at 2847 n.1.
5. Leviticus 18:22: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is ambomina-
tion." Leviticus 20:13: "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have
committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them."
6. See Rivera., supra note 1.
7. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 682 (1980).
8. Comment, Dronenburg v. Zech: Strict Construction or Abdication of Judicial Responsibil-
ity?, 12 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 643, 644 (1985).
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of personal privacy to explain those decisions9 until the June 1986 deci-
sion of Bowers v. Hardwick."°
This note discusses several pertinent cases decided prior to Bowers and
looks at constitutional challenges to sodomy laws after Bowers in an ef-
fort to understand the development, downfall and any future hope of
establishing legal recognition of homosexuals' rights to private consen-
sual sexual intimacy.
II. PERTINENT CASES DECIDED PRIOR TO BOWERS v HARDWICK
The case which is perhaps most frequently cited by sodomy statute
defenders is Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.I The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia refused to invalidate Vir-
ginia's sodomy statute"2 which was challenged by adult male
homosexuals. The plaintiffs relied on Griswold v. Connecticut,3 but the
court limited Griswold to "trespasses upon the privacy of the incidents of
marriage, upon the sanctity of the home, or upon the nurture of family
life." 14 The court quoted language from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, 5 noting that "[a]dultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual
intimacies which the State forbids."' 6 The plaintiffs argued that adult
consensual homosexual relations performed in private should be consti-
tutionally protected, but the court, borrowing again from Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe, held that privately practiced homosexuality is
not immune from criminal inquiry because of the state's "rightful con-
cern for its people's moral welfare."17 The court stated further that Vir-
ginia's statute was rationally related to suppressing crime in private or
public and that such a goal was within the state's police power.' 8
The United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the lower
court's decision.'9 While states rely on Doe to support the constitutional-
9. Id.
10. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
11. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily aff'g, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
12. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (1975). Virginia's statute pro-
vided that "[I]f any person shall carnally know... any male or female person by the anus or by or
with the mouth.. .he or she shall be guilty of a felony .. " Id. at 1200.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating statute that prohibited the use of contraception by mar-
ried people because of marital privacy).
14. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
15. 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961); also quoted by Justice Goldberg in his concurrence to Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965).
16. Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1201 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
17. Id. at 1202.
18. Id.
19. 425 U.S. 901 (1976). "[D]enial of a petition for a writ of certiorari.. .carries with it no
implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to
review." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1988], Art. 7
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol17/iss1/7
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
ity of their sodomy statutes, opponents quesion the precedential effect of
the summary affirmance. Although sodomy laws appear to conflict with
the holdings of the Griswold line of privacy rights cases,2" the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance left the question open. In its 1977 decision
of Carey v. Population Services International,2 the Supreme Court ob-
served that "the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regu-
lating private consensual sexual behavior among adults ... and we do
not purport to answer that question now."22
The Court's remark in Carey provided the impetus, in a few states, for
successful challenges to sodomy statutes. Massachusetts limited criminal
sexual activity to solicitation and public sexual touching in the presence
of people who might be offended by the act.23 Pennsylvania's statute
criminalizing voluntary deviate sexual intercourse was held to violate
equal protection and to exceed police power bounds.24
In People v. Onofre,25 New York's statute which imposed criminal
sanctions for consensual sodomy between unmarried but not married
persons was held unconstitutional on privacy and equal protection
grounds. The statute was challenged by both homosexuals and heter-
osexuals who had been convicted under the law. The New York Court
of Appeals acknowledged "a right of independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions, undeterred by governmental restraint...
referred to... as 'freedom of conduct.' "26 The court disagreed with the
state's argument that a fundamental right of personal decision extends
only to marital intimacy and procreation. 27 Relying in part on Stanley v.
Georgia,28 along with the Griswold line of cases,29 the court stated:
[P]rotecting under the cloak of the right of privacy individual decisions
20. The Griswold line of cases refers to those decisions in which the Supreme Court defined and
protected private rights of individuals, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(invalidating state statute that prohibited use of contraceptives by married people) and including but
not limited to about a dozen other cases, such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidat-
ing state statute that prohibited distribution of contraceptives except by pharmacists and physicians
to married persons) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating state statute which criminal-
ized abortion except for purposes of saving mother's life).
21. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating New York law which criminalized selling or distributing
contraceptives to minors under sixteen; the statute allowed only licensed pharmacists to distribute
contraceptives to persons sixteen or over and prohibited anyone from advertising or displaying
contraceptives).
22. Id. at 688 n.5.
23. Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 302 Mass. 108, 414 N.E.2d 602 (1980).
24. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
25. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
26. Id. at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
27. Id.
28. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (invalidating state statute criminalizing possession of obscene material
within privacy of one's home).
29. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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as to indulgence in acts of sexual intimacy by unmarried persons and as
to satisfaction of sexual desires by resort to material condemned as ob-
scene by community standards when done in a cloistered setting, no ra-
tional basis appears for excluding from the same protection decisions-
such as those made by defendants before us-to seek sexual gratification
from what at least once was commonly regarded as "deviant" conduct,
so long as the decisions are voluntarily made by adults in a noncommer-
cial, private setting.
30
The court found that the state demonstrated no rational basis for the
statute and its intrusion into people's lives. 3x As to the equal protection
claim, the court ruled that the statute, on its face, discriminated between
married and unmarried people32 and that there was no relationship be-
tween the law and the objective tendered by the state of protecting and
nurturing marriage.33
The United States Supreme Court denied the state's petition for certio-
rari. The lower court's decision on federal constitutional grounds stood,
thus extending the right of privacy to consensual sodomy in New York.
Two years later, New York's highest court heard a case related to
Onofre in which criminal defendants challenged the constitutionality of a
statute proscribing loitering in public for purposes of soliciting deviate
sexual intercourse. In People v. Uplinger,34 the New York Court of Ap-
peals ruled that, after Onofre, the conduct (consensual sodomy) contem-
plated by the loitering statute was no longer criminal, and the state had
no basis for punishing loitering for that purpose.35 The state filed a writ
of certiorari which the Supreme Court granted.36 Petitioners urged the
Court to consider the constitutionality of state laws which criminalize
adult consensual sodomy.37 The Supreme Court considered the briefs,
heard oral arguments38 and dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted.39 Again, the Court failed to address the issue of private consen-
sual homosexual conduct.
While sodomy statute challenges were considered to be better forums
for the right to privacy than were military discharge cases,' the 1984
30. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
31. Id. at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951.
32. Id. at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
33. Id. at 491-92, 415 N.E.2d at 942-43, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
34. 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514, cert. granted, 464 U.S. 812 (1983), cert.
dismissed, 467 U.S. 246 (1984).
35. Id. at 938, 447 N.E.2d at 63, 460 N.Y.S.2d 515.
36. 464 U.S. 812 (1983).
37. New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984).
38. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1210 (11th Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 1210.
40. Note, Beyond Dronenburg: Rethinking the Right to Privacy, 11 VT. L. REv. 299, 326
(1986). The author notes that the central issues in military discharge cases are employment discrim-
ination and military necessity while sodomy statute challenges are focused more on privacy.
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decision of Dronenburg v. Zech'" in the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals was indicative of problems to come for future litigants basing
their challenges on right-to-privacy arguments.42
James Dronenburg had an outstanding nine-year record of service
with the Navy prior to his 1981 discharge for misconduct due to homo-
sexual acts, a violation of Navy regulations.43 Dronenburg sued, chal-
lenging the Navy's policy of discharging all homosexuals.' The Navy's
motion for summary judgment was granted,45 and Dronenburg again ap-
pealed.46 His discharge was affirmed.47
The Dronenburg decision has been described as "the broadest and
most ringing repudiation of the view that laws penalizing homosexual
conduct are unconstitutional."48 Judge Bork's opinion has been charac-
terized as expressing "an unconcealed disdain 'for the logic in the
Supreme Court's "right of privacy rulings" including those that struck
down state laws banning abortion and restricting the sale and use of con-
traceptives.' ",4 In reviewing the Supreme Court's privacy decisions,
Judge Bork noted that "though the [Supreme] Court gave an illustrative
list of privacy rights, it also denied that the right was as broad as the
right to do as one pleases with one's body."50 Judge Bork recognized the
Supreme Court's reluctance to create new constitutional rights, stating,
"If it is in any degree doubtful that the Supreme Court should freely
create new constitutional rights, we think it certain that the lower courts
should not do so."51 The Navy's policy of mandating the discharge of
those engaged in homosexual conduct was determined to be a rational
means of achieving the legitimate state interests of maintaining discipline
and morale, rank and command systems, recruitment, and security.-
2
The Dronenburg decision exemplifies the courts' traditional deference
41. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
42. Note, supra note 40, at 300.
43. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Bork (appointed by President Reagan) and Scalia
(later appointed to the United States Supreme Court by President Reagan) and Senior District Judge
Williams (from the United States District Court for the Central District of California). Judge Bork
wrote the opinion of the court.
47. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
48. Note, supra note 40, at 299 (quoting N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1984, at 7, col. 6).
49. Id. at 300.
50. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395.
51. Id. at 1396. The court of appeals held that Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney was control-
ling notwithstanding that the case involved civilians. The court held in dictatory language that the
military may justify restrictions on its personnel that go beyond the needs of civilian society. The
court stated that even if Doe were ambiguous precedent, the ninth amendment right to privacy
would not be extended to cover Dronenburg's conduct. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392.
52. Id. at 1398.
5
Dressler: Bowers v. Hardwick: No Constitutional Protection for Private Cons
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1988
BOWERS v. HARD WICK
to the military. 3 Most homosexuals who have appealed their military
discharges have lost. 4 However, the court of appeals gave only cursory
attention to the military context of Dronenburg and limited privacy
rights to traditional marriage and familial relationships." Dronenburg
reached beyond the treatment of homosexuals in the military and
threatened to slam the door on privacy assertions by homosexual men
and women. 6
While Dronenburg was contesting his discharge from the Navy, the
constitutionality of sodomy statutes in Texas57 and Georgia 8 was being
challenged.
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed with the
plaintiff's claim that a Texas statute proscribing "engaging in deviate
sexual intercourse59 with another individual of the same sex" violated
rights of privacy and equal protection in Baker v. Wade." However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower
court and found the statute constitutional.61 The court ruled that Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney" is controlling authority until the Supreme
Court indicates otherwise,63 thus disregarding the privacy claim. As to
the equal protection argument, the Fifth Circuit determined the proper
standard of review to be whether the statute was rationally related to a
legitimate state interest." The court acknowledged society's "strong ob-
jection to homosexual conduct" and expressed that implementing moral-
ity is a permissible objective of the state. Therefore, the court held, the
statute does not deprive plaintiff of equal protection of the law.65
Approximately three months before the Baker v. Wade decision was
handed down in Texas, Michael Hardwick had obtained a more
favorable result in his challenge to Georgia's sodomy law. Although the
53. Note, supra note 40, at 317.
54. Id. at 316.
55. Note, Dronenburg v. Zech: The Wrong Case for Asserting a Right of Privacy for Homosexu-
als, 63 N.C.L. REv. 749, 750 (1985).
56. Id.
57. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.
1984), reh'g granted en banc and rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
58. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1lth Cir), reh'g denied, 765 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. granted and rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
59. "[A]ny contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person." Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 291 n.1 (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.01(1) (Vernon 1974)).
60. 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1148 (N. D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984).
reh'g granted en banc and rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
61. Baker, 769 F.2d at 291.
62. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed Hard-
wick's claim in April 1983,66 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded the case for trial, holding that the statute infringed
on Hardwick's constitutional rights and that the state should be required
to show a compelling interest for such a statute.67
The contradictory decisions of Hardwick in the Eleventh Circuit and
Baker in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals provided the impetus for the
Supreme Court to address the sodomy issue and clarify the consitutional
limits within which a state may regulate private consensual sexual
intimacy.
III. HARDWICK'S CHALLENGE TO GEORGIA'S SODOMY STATUTE
A. Facts
On August 3, 1982, a police officer went to the Atlanta home of
Michael Hardwick to serve him a warrant for failing to pay a fine for
drunkenness. 68 When a roommate let the officer into the house, he ob-
served Hardwick and another man having sex in Hardwick's bedroom.
69
The officer arrested Hardwick for violating Georgia's sodomy law.7 °
Georgia's sodomy statute states: "A person commits the offense of
sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another."' 71 Convictions
are punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than
twenty years.72
Hardwick's case was heard in the Atlanta Municipal Court, and he
was bound over to Fulton Superior Court.7 3 The District Attorney did
not present the case to the grand jury, and he formally stated that he
would not do so unless further evidence developed.74
On February 14, 1983, Hardwick and John and Mary Doe filed a com-
plaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia against Georgia Attorney General Michael Bowers, Fulton
County District Attorney Lewis Slaton, and Atlanta Public Safety Com-
missioner George Napper.75 The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring
Georgia's sodomy statute unconstitutional in so far as it makes private
66. Brief for Appellant at 2, 5, Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-
8378). The court relied on Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney in foreclosing Hardwick's claim.
67. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211.
68. Note, supra note 40.
69. Id. at 336-37.
70. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1204.
71. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
72. Id.
73. Brief, supra note 66, at 4.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2.
7
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consensual sodomy between adults a crime.76 Hardwick alleged that he
regularly engages in private homosexual acts, and because of his desire to
do so in the future, is in imminent danger of arrest, prosecution and im-
prisonment.77 Plaintiffs John and Mary Doe, a married couple, alleged
that the statute applied equally to homosexuals and heterosexuals and
that they were deterred from engaging in certain sexual activities pro-
scribed by the statute.78
In April 1983, the district court judge granted the defendants' motions
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.79
The court ruled that the Does had no justiciable claim80 and that Hard-
wick's arguments were foreclosed by the Supreme Court's summary af-
firmance of the validity of Virginia's sodomy statute in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney."1
After the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider was denied, they filed notice
of appeal on May 19, 1983.82
B. The Court of Appeals decision
Hardwick argued strenuously that the lower court erred in relying on
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney to bar his claim.83 Hardwick con-
tended that a summary affirmance merely reflects the Court's concur-
rence with the result reached below and not necessarily the basis for the
result.4 Hardwick distinguished Doe on its facts, pointing out that the
plaintiffs in Doe had never been arrested and showed no evidence of im-
miment threat of harm. Hardwick contended that doctrinal develop-
ments occurring since Doe indicate that Doe should be given little if any
weight.86 Hardwick referred to several cases in which the issue of private
consensual homosexual conduct had been addressed but noted that the
Supreme Court had yet to definitively decide the question.
The court of appeals agreed with Hardwick and construed Doe as not
controlling in this case.88 The court pointed out two actions of the
Supreme Court which demonstrated that the sodomy issue remained un-
76. Id.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3. The court of appeals affirmed that the Does had no standing and ruled that Hard-
wick did, reversing and remanding the dismissal as to Hardwick. The issue of standing is not the
focus of this note. For the court of appeals' discussion of the standing issue, see 760 F.2d at 1204-07.
83. Brief, supra note 66, at 12-19.
84. Id. at 12-13.
85. Id. at 13-14.
86. Id. at 17.
87. Id. at 17-19. See decisions discussed in part II of this note.
88. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1208.
8
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settled. First, the Court commented in Carey v. Population Services In-
ternational9 that it had "not definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regu-
lating private consensual sexual behavior among adults."90 The Hard-
wick court stated that the Carey footnote clearly encompassed private
consensual sodomy.9 Second, in dismissing the writ in New York v.
Uplinger92 after considering the briefs and hearing oral argument,93 the
Supreme Court remarked that Uplinger was an " 'inappropriate vehicle'
for resolving the 'important constitutional issues' raised by the parties," 94
and that the Court was concerned by the petitioner's decision not to chal-
lenge Onofre" which weighed heavily in the Uplinger decision. 96
Next, plaintiff Hardwick contended that a fundamental right of pri-
vacy extends to private sexual conduct between consenting adults, in-
cluding homosexuals.9 7 Hardwick argued that the logic of the decisions
reached in Onofre and by the district court in Baker "pushes inexorably
to the conclusion ... that the constitutional right of privacy extends to
... homosexuals." 98 Hardwick also contended that homosexuals are a
socially disfavored group deserving of the strict standard of evaluating
governmental interests. 99 In the alternative, Hardwick argued, he must
be afforded an opportunity to show that Georgia's sodomy statute is not
reasonably or rationally related to the stated interest of public
morality. "
The court of appeals again agreed with Hardwick, noting that "[t]he
Constitution prevents the states from unduly interfering in certain indi-
vidual decisions critical to personal autonomy because those decisions
are essentially private and beyond the legitimate reach of a civilized soci-
ety."10' 1 The court refused to limit "strict" constitutional protection to
intimate associations with a procreative purpose 02 or to the marriage
relationship. 0 3  "The benefits of marriage can inure to individuals
89. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
90. Id. at 688 n.5; see also Hardwick, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5.
91. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1209.
92. 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514, cert. granted, 464 U.S. 812 (1983), cert.
dismissed, 467 U.S. 246 (1984).
93. Uplinger, 467 U.S. at 246 (invalidating New York statute prohibiting loitering for soliciting
deviate sexual intercourse after Onofre invalidated the sodomy statute).
94. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210 (quoting Uplinger, 467 U.S. at 233-34).
95. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
96. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210.
97. Brief, supra note 66, at 20-24.
98. Id. at 22.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id. at 25-26.
101. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1211.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1212.
9
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outside the traditional marital relationship. For some, the sexual activity
in question here serves the same purpose as the intimacy of marriage.""
The court of appeals carried this further in stating that the activity in
which Hardwick hopes to engage is "quintessentially private and lies at
the heart of an intimate association beyond the proper reach of state reg-
ulation," ' 5 protected by the ninth amendment1 6 and "the notion of fun-
damental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." ' 7 The court heeded the fact that Hardwick planned to
carry out his sexual activities in private.10 8 "[T]he constitutional protec-
tion of privacy reaches its height when the state attempts to regulate an
activity in the home."109
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision and remanded
the case for trial, requiring the state to show a compelling interest in
regulating sexual behavior and that the sodomy law "is the most nar-
rowly drawn means of safeguarding that interest." ' 0 Georgia officials
appealed."11
C. The Supreme Court decision
1. Introduction.
One commentator stated that for the Supreme Court "[t]o fully reject
the Hardwick decision, [the Court] would not only have to turn away
from twenty years of its own efforts to develop principled privacy, but
would have to encourage lower courts from engaging in principled efforts
as well." '12 The Hardwick v. Bowers controversy was described as
follows:
On one level the two sides are arguing about whether the Constitution
protects "traditional, moral values" as established by state legislatures
and supported by historical inquiry, or whether it protects those intimate
associations which are of supreme importance in an individual's life and
which the individual has freely chosen. On another level, they are argu-
104. Id. The court openly acknowledged the resemblance between homosexual conduct and the
intimate association of marriage.
105. Id.
106. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
107. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... (U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1)
108. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
109. Id. The court relied in part upon Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) in which the
Supreme Court held that a state may not make the private possession of obscene material a crime.
"The absence of any public ramifications in this case plays a prominent part in our consideration of
Hardwick's legal claim." Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
110. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213.
111. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
112. Note, supra note 40, at 341.
10
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ing about whether, in a free and pluralistic society, private morality is to
be determined by the majority or the individual.
1 13
2. The majority opinion.
Justice White delivers the rather straightforward opinion of the Court
which reverses the court of appeals decision. He states the issue as:
[W]hether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidate the laws of the
many states that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time. The case also calls for some judgment about the limits of
the court's role in carrying out its constitutional mandate.
114
In addressing the issue as stated, Justice White emphasizes five main
points:
(1) The Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.
(2) The Court will not pronounce as fundamental the right to engage
in homosexual sodomy.
(3) The Court will resist expanding its authority as well as the sub-
stantive reach of the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments, particularly in redefining fundamental rights.
(4) Sodomy is illegal conduct whether or not it is committed in the
privacy of one's home.
(5) Majoritarian opinion regarding the immorality of homosexuality
is an adequate rational basis for the sodomy statute.
Hardwick attempted to have the zones of privacy expanded to include
consensual homosexual activity but the Court refused to extend privacy
that far. The Court identifies previous privacy cases as limited to matters
of child rearing and education," 5 family relationships," 6 procreation,"17
marriage,"" contraception, 1'9 and abortion. 2 ° "[W]e think it evident
that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance
to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy that is asserted in this case."'' The Court finds no connection
between family, marriage or procreation and homosexual activity,'22 and
any claim that the previous cases constitutionally protect any private
113. Goldstein, The Georgia Sodomy Case: When May a State Criminalize Bedroom Activities?,
Preview No. 12, at 350 (1986).
114. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
115. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
116. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
117. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
118. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
119. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
121. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
122. Id.
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consensual sexual conduct is unsupportable." 3
The Court is unwilling to resort to the substantive content of the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to "subsum[e]
rights that to a great extent are immune from federal or state regulation
or proscription."' 2 4 The Court states that it strives to assure the public
that announcing rights not identifiable in the Constitution involves more
than the Justices' imposing their value choices on the states and the fed-
eral government, 125 and that this is accomplished by identifying what
rights qualify for heightened judicial protection. 126 Rights qualifying for
higher levels of judicial protection are "those fundamental liberties that
are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.' "127 Fundamental liber-
ties may also be described as those which are "deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition."' 1 8 The Court holds that the right to engage
in consensual homosexual sodomy fits neither formulation. 29 The Court
notes that proscriptions of homosexuality date back to the ratification of
the Bill of Rights and continue to current times, as evidenced by the
existence of sodomy statutes in twenty-five states.
130
"The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution."' 13' The Court states
that there should be great resistence to expanding the substantive reach
of the due process clauses, otherwise the judiciary would be assuming
authority to govern the country absent express constitutional
authority.'
32
The Court refuses to extend Stanley v. Georgia 133 to protect Hard-
wick's conduct. The Court notes that Stanley was firmly grounded in the
first amendment 134 whereas Hardwick had no similar constitutional sup-
port. 135 The Court points out that illegal conduct is not always immu-





127. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
128. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
129. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
130. Id. at 2844-45.
131. Id. at 2846.
132. Id.
133. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment prohibits conviction for possessing and reading ob-
scene material in the privacy of one's home).
134. "Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.. ." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
135. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
136. Id.
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unwilling to approve of private consensual homosexual conduct while
leaving adultery, incest, and other deviate sexual acts open to
prosecution. 137
Hardwick asserted that majoritarian sentiment disfavoring homosexu-
ality is an inadequate rational basis for the sodomy law. The Court dis-
agreed, holding that laws are "constantly based on notions of
morality."' 13  Hardwick also failed to persuade the Court that majority
sentiments viewing sodomy as immoral and unacceptable were adequate
grounds upon which to invalidate sodomy statutes in twenty-five
states. 1
39
Chief Justice Burger concurs in the opinion of the Court, emphasizing
the historical proscriptions against sodomy and the rights of states to
intervene in this area."4 In a separate concurrence, Justice Powell notes
his agreement that homosexuals have no fundamental right to engage in
sodomy.14' Justice Powell implies, by way of dicta, that Hardwick had
an eighth amendment claim142 because of the lengthy prison sentence
authorized under the Georgia statute.1 43 Justice Powell notes, however,
that Hardwick had not been convicted, and Hardwick failed to raise an
eighth amendment issue.
3. The dissents.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens authored separate dissents to the ma-
jority opinion.'" The dissenters present a searching and persuasive argu-
ment, posing many issues which the majority did not reach in light of its
refusal to find a fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in consen-
sual sodomy.
Justice Blackmun first points out, after a careful review of the statute
and the complaint, that the majority distorts the issue of this case.'
45
Georgia's sodomy statute was broadened in 1968 to encompass both ho-
mosexual and heterosexual activity,146 and the intrusion into Hardwick's





140. Id. at 2847.
141. Id.
142. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VI1I.
143. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847. Justice Powell notes that the Georgia statute authorizes impris-
onment for up to twenty years for a single consensual act of sodomy.
144. Four Justices joined in the first dissent (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens) while
three joined the second dissent (Stevens, Brennan and Marshall). Justice White was joined in the
majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor.
145. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848.
146. Id. at 2849 n.1.
147. Id. at 2849.
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Second, Justice Blackmun disagrees with the Court's refusal to con-
sider whether Georgia's statute violated the eighth or ninth amendments
or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 148 Hard-
wick invoked the ninth amendment in his complaint 149 and relied upon
Griswold5 ° which identifies the ninth amendment as one of the specific
constitutional provisions giving life and substance to privacy.51 More
importantly, Justice Blackmun contends, Hardwick's complaint should
not have been dismissed even if he did not advance eighth or ninth
amendment claims or an equal protection claim if there was any ground
entitling him to relief. 52 "The Court's cramped reading of the issue
before it makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make for a persua-
sive one."
153
Justice Blackmun next points out that the Court has previously recog-
nized a privacy interest with reference to certain decisions of individuals
and certain places regardless of the activities taking place. 54 As to the
decisional aspect, the dissent warns that the reasons why the family re-
ceives constitutional protection should not be ignored. "We protect
those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material
way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a
part of an individual's life." '  The ability to define one's identity is cen-
tral to the concept of liberty and is dependent upon enriching relation-
ships with others. 56
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as
diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those
relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come
from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of
these intensely personal bonds.157
Justice Blackmun states that the majority not only refuses to recognize a
fundamental right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy, but that the
Court actually refuses to recognize a fundamental right of all individuals
to control the nature of their intimate associations with others.
1 58
As to the spatial aspect, Justice Blackmun states that the majority's
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
151. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849.
152. Id. "[The court is under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations
provide for relief on any possible theory."
153. Id. at 2850.
154. Id. at 2850-51.
155. Id. at 2851.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2852.
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interpretation of Stanley v. Georgia 59 "is symptomatic of [the Court's]
overall refusal to consider the broad principles that have informed our
treatment of privacy in specific cases."' 60 Justice Blackmun notes that
Stanley was anchored in the fourth amendment rather than entirely in
the first amendment as the majority states. 161
The right of the people to be secure in their.., houses.., is perhaps the
most textual of the various constitutional provisions that inform our un-
derstanding of the right to privacy... indeed, the right of an individual
to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home
seems... to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy.
162
In addition, Justice Blackmun believes the majority slighted the ques-
tion of whether Georgia justified its statute and infringed upon citizens'
rights.'63 While the state asserts that the acts proscribed by the statute
may have adverse consequences for general public health and welfare,
nothing in the record showed the forbidden activity to be physically dan-
gerous either to the participants or to others. 164 Justice Blackmun dis-
agrees that the length of time sodomy has been morally condemned
should withdraw the statute from scrutiny by the court.'16  "It is pre-
cisely because the issue raised by this case touches the heart of what
makes individuals what they are that we should be especially sensitive to
the rights of those whose choices upset the majority."' 6 6 Justice Black-
mun finds fault with the state's religious justification of the law, stating
that religious intolerance is no more a basis for punishment than is
race.1 67 Georgia's "protecting the public environment" argument in sup-
port of the statute is also dismissed by Justice Blackmun who notes that
punishing intimate behavior carried out in public cannot dictate how
states may regulate intimate behavior carried out in private, intimate
places.
168
In his dissent Justice Stevens is concerned that Georgia's statute vio-
lates rights of intimate privacies already accorded constitutional protec-
tion, resulting in selective enforcement of the law.'
69
First, acknowledging that Georgia's law applies equally to homosexu-
als and heterosexuals, men and women, married and unmarried, Justice
Stevens notes that married persons are protected in their decisions con-
159. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
160. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852.
161. Id. at 2852-53.
162. 'Id. at 2853.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2854.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2854-55.
168. Id. at 2855.
169. Id. at 2857-59.
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cerning their physical relationship even when offspring are not intended
and that this protection extends to unmarried people as well.170 Justice
Stevens believes that Georgia may not totally prohibit the activity pro-
scribed by the statute in light of privacies previously accorded constitu-
tional protection by the Court.
17 1
Second, the issue of selective enforcement of the law follows from the
determination that certain activity proscribed by the statute is constitu-
tionally protected. The statute applies to all sodomy and does not single
out homosexuals; 172 moreover, the Georgia Attorney General concedes
that the statute would be unconstitutional if applied to a married
couple. 173 Justice Stevens observes that Georgia failed to justify why ho-
mosexual sodomy is unacceptable and why the law is selectively ap-
plied.'7 4 Justice Stevens also states that Hardwick's claim was sufficient
to withstand a motion to dismiss.'
75
Laurence H. Tribe represented Hardwick before the Supreme Court.
He later admitted that this was his most painful loss before the Court. 1
76
Professor Tribe noted that "his major concern [was] not with sodomy per
se, but with the right of privacy and the principle of limited govern-
ment."' 177 He questioned whether the decision uprooted the right of pri-
vacy, stating that "it seems 'unprincipled' for the Court to 'draw the line
at combinations of body parts that the Justices find unpleasant to
contemplate.' "178
IV. CHALLENGES AFTER BOWERS v HARDWICK
While Bowers was pending, Oklahoma's crime against nature statute
79
was challenged in Post v. Oklahoma.8 ° Post claimed the statute violated
his right to privacy as applied to nonviolent, private, consensual, adult
activity; the Oklahoma Court of Appeals agreed.' 81 The court held that
170. Id. at 2857.
171. Id. at 2858 (relying on Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
172. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2859.
173. Id. at 2858 n.10.
174. Id. at 2859.
175. Id.
176. U.S. Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference, 55 U.S.L.W. 2225, 2227 (Nov. 25, 1986).
177. Id
178. Id. at 2226.
179. Oklahoma courts have determined that crimes against nature include unnatural sex acts of
copulation between females, cunnilingus, fellatio, and rectal coitus. Post v. Oklahoma, 715 P.2d
1105, 1106 n.1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
180. 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3249 (Oct. 14, 1986).
181. Id. at 1107. The court relied on Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Olm-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); and People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936,
434 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1980).
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the right of privacy "includes the right to select consensual adult sex
partners" '182 and "[e]xercise of this right cannot be proscribed by the
State in the absence of a compelling justification."' 83 The court further
stated that the natural repugnance for abnormal sexual acts does not jus-
tify state regulation of these activities.184
Homosexuality was not an issue in Post.'85 Oklahoma's statute was
declared unconstitutional in so far as it bars private consensual oral and
anal sex acts between heterosexual adults.' 86 In October 1986, the
Supreme Court refused to review the decision.
18 7
Homosexuality was, however, an issue in Missouri v. Walsh,'88 in
which the Supreme Court of Missouri decided that a man who sugges-
tively touched an undercover policeman must be tried for sexual miscon-
duct. 18 9 The circuit court had dismissed the charge, holding the statute
unconstitutional.' ° Walsh challenged the statute on privacy and equal
protection grounds. 9'
Walsh contended Missouri's law made class distinctions, prohibiting
males from sexual activity with males and females from sexual activity
with females, but allowing male-female sexual activity. 9' The Missouri
Supreme Court disagreed, holding the statute applied equally to men and
women "because it prohibits both classes from engaging in sexual activity
with members of their own sex." 193 The court adopted the state's inter-
pretation of the statute, "that it does not criminalize homosexuality, but
only homosexual activity."'' 94 The court noted, however, that the statute
does embody a classification based on sexual preference, 195 but that
Walsh did not contend he was a member of a group.19 6 The court fur-
ther held that the homosexual classification is outside the present list of
suspect classifications as well as "classifications to which the Supreme
Court has applied an intermediate level of scrutiny." ''
97





187. 55 U.S.L.W. 3249 (Oct. 14, 1986).
188. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
189. "A person commits the crime of sexual misconduct if he has deviate sexual intercourse with
another person of the same sex." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.090 (Vernon 1978). "[D]eviate sexual
intercourse [is] any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth, tongue, hand or
anus of another person." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010 (Vernon 1978).
190. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 508.
191. Id. at 509.





197. Id. Suspect classifications include race, national origin and alienage. Intermediate level
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The Missouri court relied on Bowers v. Hardwick,198 holding that there
was no fundamental right to engage in private consensual homosexual
activity and thus no justification for strictly scrutinizing the law.199 The
court then next addressed whether the statute bore a rational relation to
a constitutionally permissible objective. 20° The court determined that
promoting morality is a valid state objective2 01 The court also recog-
nized a legitimate interest in protecting public health and inhibiting the
spread of sexually communicable diseases such as Acquired Immune De-
ficiency Syndrome (AIDS)." 2 The court thought it irrelevant that AIDS
was not discovered until after the statute was enacted because of other
threats to public health related to anal intercourse and oral-genital sex.203
Walsh's dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded for trial.2"
Walsh is the first defeat of challenges to state sodomy laws since Bow-
ers.20 Sodomy laws in Minnesota, Louisiana and Arizona are currently
being challenged.20 6 One commentator suggests that these cases are
likely to be dismissed in the near future. 0 7
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has effectively denied homosexuals the right to
have sexual relations by upholding the constitutionality of Georgia's stat-
ute which proscribes private consensual sodomy.
The effect of sodomy statutes is not limited to the denial of sexual
contact. Such laws stigmatize homosexuals and perpetuate the "sexual
deviant" stereotype of gays.20 8 Sodomy laws lend support to discrimina-
tion against homosexuals in other aspects of their everyday lives.20 9
Judge Bork commented in Dronenburg v. Zech: "If the revolution in
sexual mores that appellant proclaims is in fact ever to arrive, we think it
must arrive through the moral choices of the people and their elected
scrutiny is limited to gender-based classifications, illegitimacy, and children of illegal aliens. The
court rejected arguments of the American Civil Liberties Union that homosexuals are a quasi-sus-
pect class. See Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 510-11.
198. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
199. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 511.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 511-12.
202. Id. at 512. AIDS was not mentioned explicitly in either Bowers v. Hardwick or Baker v.
Wade. The Missouri Supreme Court appeared willing to openly discuss the health ramifications of
homosexual conduct and even noted that the "general promiscuity" characteristic of homosexuals
made them more deserving of regulation. See Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 512-13.
203. Id. at 512.
204. Id. at 513.
205. Reidinger, Trends in the Law, 72 A.B.A. J. 78 (1986).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifi-
cations Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 802 (1984) (citation omitted).
209. Id. at 802-03.
18
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1988], Art. 7
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol17/iss1/7
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
representatives, not through the ukase of this court. '21  Thus, if there is
to be any decriminalization of sodomy in the future, efforts should be
aimed at those remaining state legislatures which have not repealed their
sodomy laws rather than attempting change through the judiciary.
JOAN BRINSON DRESSLER
210. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397.
19
Dressler: Bowers v. Hardwick: No Constitutional Protection for Private Cons
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1988
